One Question I Have for the Entire Western Conference
The NBA season is (literally) right around the corner, and there are as many reasons to watch as ever before. The Western Conference features thirteen teams with intentions on fighting for a playoff spot, which for the folks at home who may not know, means there are only two teams who aren’t. The Oklahoma City Thunder, Denver Nuggets and Minnesota Timberwolves will likely lead the race for the top seeds again, but the Dallas Mavericks, Phoenix Suns and Memphis Grizzlies are all contenders to crash that party. If not, they’ll all be fighting to stay out of the Play-In Tournament, which is a realistic high-end outcome for all of the Los Angeles Lakers and Clippers, Sacramento Kings, Golden State Warriors, New Orleans Pelicans, Houston Rockets and San Antonio Spurs. All across the conference there are expectations for success, and the season promises to be one of the most competitive we’ve seen in a long time.
With the season about to begin, here’s one question I have for all 15 teams in the Western Conference. This is coming just before the season started, but a few of the questions I had revolved players whose rookie contract extension deadline was October 21st, and I wanted to see the resolution of those negotiations. I hope you enjoy!
DAL: How does the defense hold up without Derrick Jones Jr.?
Last season: 50-32 (5th in West), lost in NBA Finals
When the Dallas Mavericks traded for PJ Washington and Daniel Gafford at the 2024 trade deadline, they were 29-23 in the middle of a packed Western Conference playoff race. Opinions on just how much better the team got varied in the immediate aftermath, but I think it’s safe to say even the most optimistic folks didn’t see Dallas’ second half surge coming. The Mavs went 21-9 to close the season, posting the league’s third best net rating over that span — lineups with Washington alongside tentpole stars Luka Doncic and Kyrie Irving were an astonishing 12.8 points per 100 better than their opponents, per Cleaning the Glass. Washington’s combination of size and shooting unlocked a new level for the Mavs on both ends, while pairing Gafford with rookie stud Dereck Lively II gave Dallas’ backcourt 48 minutes of pick & roll competence. Simply put, the Mavericks were a new team after the trade deadline, one that made it all the way through the Western Conference playoff gauntlet before falling to the Boston Celtics in the NBA Finals.
As good a job as they did at the trade deadline, Dallas’ lead decision-makers clearly weren’t satisfied. At the outset of the offseason, they swung a deal to land Klay Thompson, pairing one of the deadliest shooters in league history with two offensive virtuosos in the hopes of supercharging their offense. Indeed, the Mavs look poised to be one of the league’s trickiest solves on that end this season with the constant threat of Thompson’s jumper and the roll gravity of Lively and Gafford giving their two on-ball wizards plenty of space to operate and easy decisions to make. For an offense that too often stalled out in the Finals, that potency could wind up being a boon if the Mavericks can make another deep run. (Even if they do, I don’t think I’ll ever get used to the sight of Thompson in a non-Warriors jersey.)
But basketball is a two-way game, and Dallas’ roster substantially changed on the other side of the ball, too. Their most notable offseason loss was starting small forward Derrick Jones Jr., whose defense at the point of attack was critical to the Mavs’ playoff success, but after shipping Josh Green to Charlotte as part of the Thompson sign-and-trade they arguably lost their two most athletic wing defenders in one summer. Replacing Jones with Thompson in the starting lineup should be a clear upgrade on offense, but the defensive hierarchy of that unit is going to look quite different. Klay’s best days as a ball hawk are behind him after several lower body injuries, and he’s spent much of the last few seasons playing off of the ball as a helper. That’s similar to the role Washington slotted into last season, but without Jones in the lineup, he’ll have a different set of responsibilities. This isn’t to say he can’t handle them, just that things aren’t going to look the same as last season.
Possibly to compensate for the loss of Jones, Dallas went out and signed Naji Marshall, a shrewd move for a two-way wing that fits the mold they were looking to replace. It can be argued that Marshall is an even better fit than Jones was; though he’s less athletic, Marshall is both a better shooter and ball-handler, capable of driving closeouts and keeping advantages alive in a way Jones simply didn’t last season. But Marshall isn’t going to start for the Mavs, and while he still projects to have a pretty big role and may end up closing some games, his spot in the rotation differing from Jones’ while playing a similar role means that Dallas will have to make some schematic adjustments for how they want to guard. Turning Tim Hardaway Jr.’s expiring contract into Quentin Grimes gave them a flier on a young player who’s had an up-and-down career but whose high-end outcome is a more than solid complementary piece. But that outcome is far from guaranteed, and with Dante Exum slated to miss the first portion of the season after undergoing wrist surgery, the Mavs are looking a tad light on plus perimeter defensive talent.
This might seem like a nitpicky question to some, but these kinds of details really matter. Dallas had a formula that worked well enough to win the West; now, that formula is going to have to change. It’s very possible that Washington assumes the aforementioned role well enough to make it work, with Thompson sliding into a secondary role where just doing his job is enough. The rapid development of Lively can’t be overlooked either — he showed some flashes of being able to guard in multiple schemes during the playoffs, and if that growth is meaningful then Dallas’ entire strategy could change for the better anyway. In any case, they’ll still have the Lobgoblins to protect the rim on top of a coaching staff that seems to be quite good at motivating this roster on the defensive end. If this team can remain good-to-very-good defensively, they’ll be in great position to crash the West playoff party again. With Doncic entering what should be the prime of his career, I’m excited to see the level that the Mavericks can reach.
DEN: What version of Jamal Murray will we get?
Last season: 57-25 (2nd in West), 2nd round exit
At this point, Nikola Jokic has asserted himself as the best player of his era — an offensive supernova who can score from all three levels while being firmly established as one of the best passers of all time. He’s one of nine three-time MVPs in NBA history, as well as a Finals MVP after leading the Denver Nuggets to their first ever championship in 2023. Jokic turned Denver into a team that could sincerely believe they could win a championship effectively by himself, but you can’t win a title by yourself. And if time has proven one player to be their true bellwether of success in the playoffs, it’s not Jokic, but Jamal Murray.
Murray entered the league in 2016, one year after Jokic. The two grew into their status as Denver’s building blocks together, breaking out with 54 wins in 2018-19. That season ended one game shy of the Western Conference Finals, falling at home to a more experienced Portland Trail Blazers team. The seeds of greatness were planted in that first playoff run, and they sprouted quick. The next year’s playoffs took place in the Orlando Bubble, where Denver became the first team to ever overcome two 3-1 series deficits in one postseason against the Utah Jazz and Los Angeles Clippers. Jokic was incredible in that run, but it was Murray who led the team in scoring at over 26 points per game, often stealing the show with ridiculous shotmaking and clutch composure. He scored 50 points twice in the first round, then 40 in the series-clinching Game 7 in round two. Even once they ran out of answers against the Lakers in the Western Conference Finals, it was clear that something special was brewing in Denver.
Unfortunately, the Nuggets would have to wait three years to see that vision through. Murray tore his ACL just before the 2021 playoffs, costing him two entire postseasons — just as Jokic was ascending into all-time form. Consecutive MVP regular seasons weren’t enough to win Denver more than one round combined in the playoffs; without Murray, they were effectively gap years. But when Murray returned in 2023 and the Nuggets surged to the best record in the West, Denver’s foundational duo were ready to show everybody that what happened in Orlando was no fluke. Lineups with Jokic and Murray had a net rating of +14.3 in the 2023 playoffs (per Cleaning the Glass) as the Nuggets cruised to a 16-4 record and the championship. Jokic became the first player to ever lead a postseason in points, rebounds, and assists, but Murray put together an all-time playoff run himself, averaging 26 points and 7 assists on nearly 50/40/90 shooting — plus an NBA-record four consecutive triple-doubles to start his Finals career. Jokic and Murray’s two-man game became the NBA’s ultimate ace in the hole down the stretch of games, a truly unstoppable dance between hyper-threats operating completely in sync.
In their first healthy season during the MVP Jokic era, the Nuggets were champions built on the backs of Jokic and Murray. They dominated in 2023-24, tying a franchise record for wins as Jokic won MVP yet again. A second consecutive title didn’t seem far-fetched in the slightest, but both players would need to return to the playoff heights they’d proven capable of reaching. So when Murray strained his calf during their first round series against the Lakers, we probably should have known that a ring wasn’t in the cards last season. Even though he still hit two game-winners in that series, Murray’s numbers were starkly down across the board all playoffs, which the Nuggets simply couldn’t afford. Denver went from dominating the Jokic/Murray minutes in the 2023 playoffs to straight up losing them in 2024, culminating in a blown 20-point second half lead at home to the Minnesota Timberwolves in Game 7 of the second round. Winning back-to-back championships is insanely hard, but the Nuggets with a hampered Murray were simply a different team.
There are a lot of questions one could ask about Denver for this season. After letting Kentavious Caldwell-Pope walk in free agency (and losing a top-six player from their championship run for the second summer in a row), Denver has a hole at starting shooting guard and a deficit in talent compared to the last two years. Questions about depth will be as loud as ever, and multiple young players would need to break out to quiet them — not a great place to be for a championship contender. They’re also woefully light on shooting across the roster, something the addition of Russell Westbrook certainly doesn’t aid in (at least on his own). It’s easy to point out several reasons why Denver won’t win the title this year. But as strange as this might sound, I still see an inner circle contender — albeit one with less margin for error than ever. When healthy, Jokic and Murray have proven capable of rising to the moment like almost nobody I’ve seen; if there’s any player in the league I would trust to make tight offensive windows work, it’d be the Joker. The best version of this team is still capable of beating anyone in the league, but it all hinges on Murray. I don’t think it’s a stretch to call him the single biggest X-factor in the Western Conference, if not the entire NBA.
GSW: Is it Jonathan Kuminga time?
Last season: 46-36 (10th in West), lost in Play-In Tournament
I’m gonna be real for a second: I was a little scared this question will become immediately outdated right after I published it. Kuminga and the Golden State Warriors had no traction on an extension ahead of the October 21st deadline for first round picks heading into their fourth seasons, and a deal never wound up getting done. Kuminga’s camp was seemingly holding out for a number that wasn’t on the table. If the sides got too far apart, a trade to a more willing team didn’t feel impossible. But though the road hasn’t always been smooth, the Warriors seem to be keeping him — and they might need a true Kuminga breakout if they want to enter more serious discussions in the West.
As Steph Curry continues into his late 30s and the Warriors’ 2022 championship run gets farther and farther away, the team’s efforts to remain in contention have been largely futile. Two frustrating seasons mired in turmoil led to the departures of Jordan Poole and now Klay Thompson, jettisoning talent out the door with just about no return to speak of. They struck gold in the 2023 draft with Brandin Podziemski and Trayce Jackson-Davis, but their overall record the last few seasons has been spotty — aside from the well-documented James Wiseman fiasco, former lottery pick Moses Moody is still fighting for a consistent rotation spot four seasons into his career. For a team that spent several seasons deep in the luxury tax, those are the sort of needle-moving margins you can hardly afford to miss.
That’s why Kuminga is so important for the Warriors. They have a player who just broke the franchise record for dunks in a season and averaged 16 points per game at 21 years old despite only starting in 46 of them. His athleticism makes him nearly unstoppable heading downhill, as evidenced by his 74% shooting at the rim at high volume. His frame and wingspan also make him a very switchable defender, so he checks a lot of boxes as a two-way wing prospect — the most coveted player-type in the league. But his team is unwilling to offer him a max contract, and there appear to be a few reasons why. For all his prowess at the rim, Kuminga’s jumpshot hasn’t evolved at all; last year, he shot 33% at the lowest frequency of his career. Teams aren’t shy about ignoring him from deep, which hinders his viability on a team already reliant on so many non-shooters in the frontcourt. Playing him and Draymond Green at forward together might be the worst spaced frontcourt in the league, but playing him at power forward complicates his ability to guard perimeter options.
A more fundamental disconnect has impacted Kuminga’s on-court life with the Warriors. His style of shot creation requires the ball in his hands a lot, and he’s never been an advanced playmaker. That directly contrasts with the Warriors’ egalitarian ethos, upon which they built a dynasty. Built essentially around Curry’s off-ball movement, Golden State’s system of screens, cuts and short rolls requires quick decision-making and a heads-up approach. The things Kuminga does well — and the things Kuminga wants to do —don’t mesh with that vision. For a young player trying to prove his mettle in the league, his play to this point isn’t exactly surprising. But if he’s to really pop as a Warrior, that’s a big piece of how. The Warriors added several players in the offseason that can play how they want between Kyle Anderson, De’Anthony Melton and Buddy Hield. There’s a Warriors-esque infrastructure on this roster; we’ll see how Kuminga fits in.
Outside of Kuminga, the Warriors remain what they have been for a few years: deep, talented, slow and small. Curry and Green navigated a season and a half without Thompson as he rehabbed his Achilles tear, but they’ll have to navigate true life without him for the first time in over a decade. There’s a lot to be excited about with many of the individual players on this roster, but too many of them fall into the same issues on both ends of the floor. In a West this competitive — and an NBA not-so-sneakily trending bigger — their margin for error is as small as any in the conference. Kuminga is their only potential get-out-of-jail free card, so to speak. His development with the Warriors is the thing I’m most looking forward to this season.
HOU: What does this team want its identity to be?
Last season: 41-41 (11th in West), missed postseason
There aren’t many teams across the league with a future outlook as rosy as the Houston Rockets. Aside from owning several future first round picks from multiple teams, they have seven players from the last four drafts with the potential to be high-level NBA starters at the very least. Their ascent from the league’s cellar to a .500 record under new coach Ime Udoka last season demonstrated the franchise’s intent on developing its young players while actively competing for wins, an approach that makes sense given their dearth of talent. But as the Rockets enter Year Two of this return to competence, the time to make important decisions about the direction of this roster is quickly arriving.
The only downside to having as many good young players as Houston does is that it’s effectively impossible to keep all of them long-term. The Rockets are going to have to assess each of them to determine who’s worth building around, who might fit next to those players, and who simply doesn’t fit into their vision. Their reluctance to hand out max contract extensions to either Jalen Green or Alperen Sengun, who played at a sub-All-Star level last season, is plenty evidence of that. Locking themselves into big money would only hinder their ability to resign the rest of their players down the line, and I don’t know if they’re completely sold on either Green or Sengun as building blocks of the future. Green’s historically unique contract can stand as proof of that, but Sengun was pretty capably Houston’s most productive player last year; it’s not unreasonable to envision scenarios where neither is on the next great Rockets team.
If that sounds absurd to you, consider a few things: Houston’s rise last year came almost entirely on the defensive end of the floor, unsurprising given who took over as head coach. The Rockets finished 2023-24 with the league’s seventh best defensive rating, per Cleaning the Glass, compared to 20th in offensive rating despite Sengun’s breakout. Udoka very clearly helped facilitate massive improvements on that end, but Houston’s roster is also chock full of versatile defenders like Jabari Smith Jr. and Tari Eason, both extension eligible next summer. It’s not hard to put two and two together and at least wonder about Sengun’s fit on a team like that long-term considering his deficiencies as a rim protector and guarding in space. Conversely, it’s almost laughably easy to imagine a team like that built around Amen Thompson, the fourth pick in the 2023 draft. The only thing Thompson doesn’t have in his arsenal is a jumpshot, and while that will absolutely be the skill that determines his ceiling, the things he brings to the table right now are frankly absurd. He’s a 6’7 point guard with passing chops and the ability to guard all up and down the lineup — and did I mention he might be the single most athletic player in the NBA?
The Rockets thus have two players they could theoretically build the boat around. Their problem is that it’s going to be highly difficult to build around them together. Thompson’s lack of a jumpshot would cramp the floor for Sengun down low, simultaneously making double teams simpler and the reads out of them more difficult. Sengun’s skills as a creator are optimized with shooting and cutting around him operating closer to the basket; Thompson’s rampages to the basket don’t exactly mesh with that vision. Ill-fitting stars can make it work if they’re good enough, but the returns on such partnerships are frustratingly limited — if the Joel Embiid/Ben Simmons era in Philadelphia (not a horrific analog to this situation) taught me anything, it’s that. And then there’s the rest of the roster: the aforementioned Smith and Eason, rookie guard Reed Sheppard, and second year scoring phenom Cam Whitmore are all still coming into their own as players. Any one of them ascending into bona-fide All-Star territory — or at least making that feel realistic — could change the Rockets’ internal calculus to a significant degree.
To recap, the Rockets have two possible young cornerstones, a bevy of potential breakout candidates across the positional spectrum, and a framework of competency on the court such that we should be able to learn a lot about all of them this season. The style that Udoka wants to play, and that much of the roster represents, is fundamentally different from the one that optimizes the best player currently on the team. Do the Rockets want to shift that identity some to meet Sengun in the middle, or hard-line it to where he either fits or he doesn’t? As Thompson keeps developing as a player, what does that mean for Green, Whitmore and Sheppard’s places in the backcourt pecking order? Can Smith or Eason take another step and establish themselves as pieces unequivocally worth building around? The answer to any of these questions may fundamentally shift Houston’s identity. There are so many directions this roster and organization could take moving forward, and the fallout of whichever path is walked could see some serious talent on the move. Once the smoke clears, I’m fascinated to see what sort of team this becomes.
LAC: How much can James Harden carry an offense in 2025?
Last season: 51-31 (4th in West), 1st round exit
If I were to ascribe a word to the position the Los Angeles Clippers found themselves in this offseason, it would be “unenviable.” The Kawhi Leonard/Paul George era of contention officially came to an end with George’s departure to the Philadelphia 76ers in free agency, ending a chapter in the franchise’s history full of high hopes and, ultimately, failed expectations. With that, any internal hope this team could compete for a title was more than likely dashed, but the Clippers are in no position to take a step back and rebuild. Aside from still employing the recently extended Leonard and resigning James Harden in free agency, LA owns none of its first round picks until 2030. And with the brand new Intuit Dome set to begin hosting Clipper games into perpetuity, there’s zero incentive across the organization to stop being competitive. In other words, LA is stuck in the middle.
To that effect, the Clippers went to work to ensure this roster will still have at least a puncher’s chance throughout the regular season. After poaching Derrick Jones Jr. from the Dallas Mavericks, resigning Nicolas Batum, and bringing in Kris Dunn from the Utah Jazz, the Clips project to have a pretty formidable defense when healthy. Incumbents Leonard, Terance Mann and Ivica Zubac all already bring value on that end; the pathway to a versatile, creative and hard-nosed regular season defense is pretty clear to see. At the very least, that will give LA a decently high floor on most nights to try and grind wins out. I use that phrasing purposefully — because from the outset, it looks like it’s gonna be a grind on the other end of the floor.
There are several plus defenders that project to fill out LA’s rotation, but the number of proven shot creators is much, much smaller. To be exact, it’s four: Leonard, Harden, Norman Powell, and Kevin Porter Jr. (and that’s only if you project him as a rotation player). Of that crop, Harden is the only one with the ability to create good looks for others at a sustainably high clip. Fortunately for the Clippers, he’s also one of the most prolific offensive engines the league has ever seen. Harden’s teams have performed better offensively with him on the court than off for every single season of his career — last year, the Clippers were 7.2 points per 100 better on that end, per Cleaning the Glass. Despite aging into his 30s, Harden has proven to still be one of the league’s premiere drivers of efficient offense.
This season might put that statement to the test. Harden will certainly have things to work with: a capable pick & roll partner in Zubac, proven catch & shoot threats in Powell, Batum, and Mann, and the presence of Leonard to put more pressure on defenses. But Leonard is out indefinitely with a knee injury; in his absence, Harden’s going to have to do a lot of heavy lifting. While the aforementioned players have proven they can hit open threes, players like Jones, Dunn and Amir Coffey have not, due to either a lack of volume or efficiency. Defenses won’t be afraid to pinch the floor with those players on the floor, which makes Harden’s job more difficult as a generator of good looks. On top of that, the number of secondary playmakers on this roster is quite limited — other than Mann and Batum, it’s hard to find players that I’d feel good about consistently stringing out advantages to create good looks, and Batum’s best days may well be behind him. If Leonard were to miss a significant chunk of the season, there’s going to be a lot of pressure on Harden to lift the offense to competence.
I mentioned above that Harden has remained an incredibly valuable scorer and playmaker past his prime, and now more than ever we’re seeing players stay at a high level well into their 30s. But at 35, it’s reasonable to wonder the degree to which that impact can scale up as time goes on. The Clippers are putting a lot of faith in him; while his play has warranted that faith, Father Time may simply not. And all of this analysis implies Harden’s health — though he was one of the league’s iron men for much of his prime, he hasn’t had the cleanest bill of health since his Houston Rocket days. The Clips can hardly afford a meaningful decline from the Beard, let alone an extended injury absence. There’s really not a lot to be overly enthusiastic about this team, from its high-end outcomes to its long-term outlook to its margin of error in this very moment. At least in the short term, Harden is arguably the most important player on the roster if the Clippers want to look back and call this time a success for their standards. Arguably more importantly for the rest of the league, his ability to perform could (absurdly ironically) end up being the difference between the Oklahoma City Thunder, who own their pick, cementing a dynasty with a top draft selection and simply adding to their core with a middling first round pick. Even if there’s arguably nothing to play for internally long-term at Intuit Dome, this season could have some frankly insane ramifications if it goes poorly.
LAL: Can JJ Redick make a meaningful change?
Last season: 47-35 (7th in West), 1st round exit
To be honest, there’s not a whole lot for me to wonder about this roster as presently constructed. LeBron James and Anthony Davis remain two of the league’s best players, even with James heading into his 22nd season. The roster around them is good enough to compete for a playoff spot in the West and capable of making a run against favorable matchups, but given their standing in the West (finishing as a 7th seed the past two seasons) that isn’t remotely the most likely outcome — they’re much more likely to face a team as good as the Nuggets in the first round, as they did in 2024, than the Conference Finals, like they did in 2023. Title odds seem improbable, but so long as two players as good as James and Davis are on the team, a championship should remain the internal goal.
The 2025 roster is largely the same as the last two seasons, but head coach Darvin Ham was replaced by JJ Redick, a first-time head coach with no prior NBA coaching or front office experience. While there’s inherent risk to a move like this, isn’t unprecedented for former players to assume head coaching roles off rip; for instance, both Jason Kidd and Steve Kerr began their coaching careers in the lead seat (though Kerr did spend years running the Phoenix Suns prior to coaching). Redick demonstrated his X&O chops as a member of the media, and we can expect him to come into this situation with a fresh tactical mind compared to years past. So far, it appears he wants to modernize the Lakers’ offensive schemes with creative and versatile sets, and, crucially, taking far more three pointers.
The Lakers lived at the rim in the Darvin Ham era, ranking second in rim shot frequency in each of the last two seasons, per Cleaning the Glass. But they’ve also been one of the lowest volume three-point shooting teams in the league, ranking 28th and 27th the last two years, respectively. Redick has seemingly been on the entire roster about taking more threes, including Anthony Davis. This formula — five-out spacing to stretch defenses to their breaking point while increasing optionality within plays — looks to be taken right out of the Boston Celtics’ playbook, who rampaged through the league on the way to a title playing that style. But shooting was evidently an organizational priority when building out Boston’s roster, and every rotation player is at least a good one. The same, well, can’t be said for the Lakers. Davis and Jarred Vanderbilt stand out in that regard; Davis has made a putrid 24.8% of his threes over the last four seasons, while Vanderbilt has only taken 138 in his career — for reference, 71 players made more threes last season than Vanderbilt has ever shot in the NBA. Both players sit at under 30% from distance for their careers. The urge to open up the floor and amp the team’s offense is understandable, but I have serious personnel questions that could undermine its efficacy in practice.
Both Davis and Vanderbilt also project to be a large part of LA’s defense, which was middling last year despite Davis having one of the best seasons of his career on that end. LA was successful in deterring shots at the rim, but they gave up a lot of threes above the break. With opponents hitting 38.1% of their threes and 66.7% of their shots at the rim against the Lakers (each the sixth highest number in the league, per CTG), it’s not hard to see why their overall efficiency suffered on that end. Redick will need to figure out ways to enhance the impact of Davis’ rim protection in LA’s best lineups — somehow, the Lakers’ defensive rating was almost unchanged when Davis was on the floor versus off, which shouldn’t even be possible considering how good Davis is on that end. This is really where the issues on this roster come to bear, in my opinion. Their starting backcourt of D’Angelo Russell and Austin Reaves is a pretty strong minus on defense, and their better options either have too many question marks (like Cam Reddish and the young Max Christie) or project to have too small a role (hello, Jordan Goodwin) for me to feel good about them as reliable options from the outset.
The Lakers have shown a willingness to take big swings in the James era, and with two first round picks available to trade and several mid-sized contracts, I’m sure they’re going to be gauging the market for players that better fit Redick’s vision for the team all season. In the meantime, though, we’re going to have to see what he can do with what he has. If this goes well, it’s possible that LA breaks out of its recent Play-In residency and into a different tier in the West, gifting them better matchups and an easier shot at a deep run. The Lakers still have a championship-caliber star duo, and there’s no chance any team would head into a seven game series against them feeling outright good. Redick has a chance to capitalize on that — if he can optimize this roster in ways Ham was unable to, those high-end outcomes might seem a little less far-fetched in April.
MEM: Will the halfcourt offense improve from years past?
Last season: 27-55 (13th in West), missed postseason
With all that’s gone on between now and then, it’s easy to forget that the Memphis Grizzlies were considered one of the NBA’s rising juggernauts as soon as two years ago. Back-to-back 50-win seasons in 2022 and 2023 behind Ja Morant, Jaren Jackson Jr., Desmond Bane and a deep team that played one of the league’s most entertaining styles. A ferocious defense built an electrifying transition attack, running other teams into the ground with a smile. The vibes couldn’t have changed more dramatically last season, when a suspension and shoulder injury limited Morant to just nine games and injuries utterly decimating the rest of the roster. The Grizzlies enter this season a different team than their last successful iteration in more ways than one, but there’s a lot to be optimistic about for their return to relevance.
Morant’s return will make a world of difference by itself, but he’s not the only stud on the roster. Bane remains one of the league’s premiere snipers at high volume, making up the other half of one of the best backcourts in the NBA when healthy. Jackson is just two years removed from one of the best defensive seasons in recent memory, but he spent much of last season developing his offensive game, blasting career-highs in isolation frequency with decent results (0.99 points per possession, according to nba.com./stats). If Memphis’ Big Three can each become efficient scoring threats, the Grizzlies will be in a good place in the halfcourt, rendering my question silly. But that’s never been how this team has operated, and it would represent a pretty major deviation from how this era of Grizzlies basketball has gone.
For the entirety of their time with Morant, the Grizzlies have surrounded him with a huge body at center capable of hoovering offensive rebounds to keep halfcourt possessions alive. First Jonas Valanciunas then Steven Adams were life rafts for a struggling halfcourt offense, creating extra scoring chances at an elite clip. (They also made up for Jackson’s deficiencies as a rebounder.) In that department, there’s more uncertainty than there’s ever been. Their projected starting center is rookie giant Zach Edey, who may well thrive from the jump as a rebounding machine and interior presence. But it’s no sure thing at all, and if he can’t fill the role the Grizzlies need from him, they might be in some trouble.
Generally, the Grizzlies are poised for a pretty big bounce-back. There’s plus defensive personnel across the roster from Marcus Smart to Vince Williams Jr., and this team should thrive in the open court again. Morant should be one of the league’s best shows again, and Memphis should be right in the thick of the Western Conference playoff race once again. But to reach the next level as a team over the next few years, their halfcourt offense will be the bellwether of their success. There isn’t a lot of reason for hope down the rest of the roster right now, so the growth of their stars — and the play of their rookie — this season will give me a pretty solid baseline for how to evaluate this team going forward.
MIN: How much will the additions of Julius Randle and Donte DiVincenzo boost their offense?
Last season: 56-26 (3rd in West), lost in Western Conference Finals
For many franchises, a 56-win season resulting in a conference finals berth would be treated as a soundly successful year. For the Minnesota Timberwolves, who did just that last season, it represents one of the literal high marks in franchise history. Their second Western Conference Finals appearance was also the second time Minnesota ever advanced past the first round, twenty years after the first one. Behind their two former number one picks Anthony Edwards and Karl-Anthony Towns plus the Defensive Player of the Year in Rudy Gobert, the Wolves were one of the most formidable teams all season in a ruthless conference, fighting for the top seed until the very end. They were the NBA’s best defensive team, which helped them overcome a middling offense (ranked 16th by Cleaning the Glass) and a lack of volume shooting. By all accounts, 2023-24 was one of the single most successful seasons the Timberwolves have ever experienced.
But the team was also prohibitively expensive, and due to some combination of factors Minnesota decided to make a dramatic change. Now Towns, the longest-tenured Timberwolf and the first overall selection in the 2015 draft, is a New York Knick, and the Wolves have Julius Randle and Donte DiVincenzo in his place. The Wolves traded their best shooter for another high-volume shot creator and a perimeter defender who hit the third most threes in the league last season, a fascinating basketball decision that will change how the Wolves’ offense will operate. Randle and head coach Chris Finch have a positive prior relationship, so his integration will hopefully get off to an easy start, but there are a lot of things Randle brings to the table. His ability to draw extra defenders as a shot creator amplifies his playmaking vision, which will be an upgrade from Towns. Randle was having arguably the best stretch of his career before a shoulder injury ended his 2024 season; decisions were faster, possessions were crisper, and the Knicks’ offense was rolling. Randle’s also played nearly all of his minutes as a Knick (and thus as an All-NBA-caliber player) next to a non-shooting rim protector, so his fit next to Gobert isn’t difficult to envision at all.
In DiVincenzo, the Wolves are getting one of the best complementary two-way guards in the NBA to likely come off of their bench, an incredible depth add. I mentioned that he hit the third-most threes in the NBA last year, but that season started with him as a bit player off the bench, increasing in role and importance as injuries continued to hamper the Knicks. By playoff’s end, he was a crucial starter playing huge minutes. His role in Minnesota is going to land somewhere in the middle, assuming health in the starting lineup, but the Wolves have a player whose role they know they can scale up in a pinch. DiVincenzo is a pesky on-ball defender who will fit the Wolves’ defensive identity, but his floor spacing could be crucial in several lineups. Bench lineups with him and Naz Reid will be the spaciest ones the Wolves will play, and the Wolves will have another shooter to fill in units with Randle and Gobert.
Despite losing one of the single best shooters in the NBA, the Wolves will arguably have more shooting balance in their lineups. The fact that their second best shot creator was their best shooter made things a little clunky; replacing him with a better playmaker and a good shooter to capitalize on that playmaking could make wind up creating more open quality threes in the aggregate (in other words, Randle may well create more good threes for DiVincenzo and the Wolves’ other shooters than Towns could for himself). We’ll see if the Wolves can replicate their defensive greatness this season, but in all likelihood they’re going to remain quite good on that end. The upside this trade represents for Minnesota is on the other end of the floor, and there’s intriguing potential to hit a level that they couldn’t with Towns on the roster. There’s also a chance this results in no material change, or make them even worse. Randle will need to learn to mesh with Edwards and his other new teammates, and that learning curve could take some time to overcome. As Edwards continues getting better, the Wolves’ offense will need to keep up. This was a team that made it one round from the championship and now looks radically different on one side of the floor. I don’t know what’s going to happen with the Wolves this season, but their surprise blockbuster makes them one of the teams I’m most fascinated by.
NOP: What the hell is going on?
Last season: 49-33 (8th in West), 1st round exit
The New Orleans Pelicans probably didn’t anticipate being in the position they’re currently in a few months ago. They were surging in a stacked Western Conference playoff race, and Zion Williamson’s long-awaited playoff debut felt imminent. But everything changed when Williamson left their Play-In Tournament game against the Lakers early with a calf injury. In a flash, New Orleans went from possible playoff dark horse to dead in the water. They would lose that game, limping into the playoffs as an eighth seed with no Zion and a hobbled Brandon Ingram and getting swept by the Oklahoma City Thunder in dominant fashion. But despite the team’s top-10 defense and Williamson having the best stretch of his career in the second half of the season leading to nearly 50 wins, New Orleans somehow went 0-22 in the playoffs after trailing through three quarters — the worst such record in NBA history. (Cruelly, they were well positioned to end that streak against the Lakers in the Play-In Tournament before Zion’s near-single-handed comeback bid was cut short).
It was clear that something had to change, injuries or otherwise. Head of basketball operations David Griffin said as much after the season. Trading for Dejounte Murray early in the summer seemed like a step in the right direction, acquiring one of the league’s most efficient isolation scorers that can hopefully fit the team’s defensive identity. But that felt like the first of potentially many moves this offseason — with Ingram entering the last year of his contract and no traction on an extension, he felt like one of the most likely big names to be moved. And after letting Jonas Valanciunas walk in free agency and sending Larry Nance Jr. to Atlanta as part of the package for Murray, the Pelicans’ only true center was 20-year-old Yves Missi, whom they had just drafted. At least one trade to solve both issues and balance out the roster felt inevitable.
Fast forward to just before the season and… Ingram is still on the roster, and the Pelicans’ only additions at center have been Daniel Theis and Karlo Matkovic (the 52nd pick in the 2022 Draft), both on minimums. New Orleans’ roster right now is talented, but it quite frankly doesn’t make much sense. Between Williamson, Ingram, Murray, CJ McCollum, Herb Jones, and Trey Murphy III, the Pels have six players who could reasonably start — a good issue to have in theory, but none of them are centers. There are so many fundamental questions I have about this team on both ends. If they really want to improve their offense, the easiest path would be to up their three-point volume. Two of the aforementioned six players are proven high-volume threats from distance: McCollum and Murphy. Because of the stature of Williamson, Ingram, and Murray and how integral Jones is to their defense, those are also the two players fighting for the last place in the starting lineup. While I can see the logic in playing Zion as a functional center on offense to free him up, what makes him really unstoppable is his ability to weaponize the absurd gravity he has for others. That’s another part of why an Ingram trade made sense: to free up a starting spot for Murphy. If Williamson spends more time on the court with fewer shooters to create for — and if a decent chunk of the team’s shot diet is self-created midrange shots from Ingram and Murray — his overall offensive impact feels like it’s being mitigated.
The defensive side of the ball is probably even more confusing to me right now. The Pelicans finished eighth in defensive rating last season despite allowing the tenth-fewest shots at the rim at the third-worst clip in the league, an impressive feat largely due to the greatness of Herb Jones. Valanciunas wasn’t a rim protector at all, and it felt like a prime area to improve in the offseason, so his departure made sense. But that improvement never came, and they do lose his rebounding prowess on both ends. It feels like New Orleans plans on banking on Jones’ extraordinary abilities to help Williamson at center enough to make those lineups tenable defensively. But losing Dyson Daniels and Naji Marshall in the offseason made their perimeter defense weaker across the board, and so Jones is being asked to do a lot; stretching him this thin doesn’t feel like an optimal use of his talents, even if he’s capable. It seems like New Orleans is trying to replicate its strategy of mitigating shots at the rim and encouraging low-percentage threes, but they’re going to be incredibly small this time around. How successful will that strategy ultimately be over the course of a season?
All of this presumes the Pelicans are satisfied with their roster right now, which I don’t find very easy to believe. It’s wholly possible the trade market underwhelmed them this summer. I’m sure Ingram’s name will return to trade rumors as the season goes on due to his contract situation more than anything else, and I personally wouldn’t be surprised if the Pelicans went after a rim protector in their return package. In the meantime, it seems the starting lineup will be McCollum, Murray, Ingram, Jones, and Williamson, with Murphy coming off the bench yet again. This team should still be competitive in the Western Conference, but there’s simply not a lot of precedent for what they’re going to try and do, so I have really no idea what to think about them. I’m sorry if this one feels kind of all over the place, but this team just feels so unresolved; I’m probably more fascinated by the Pelicans than any other team in the NBA for this upcoming season.
OKC: What does Year Two Chet Holmgren look like?
Last season: 57-25 (1st in West), 2nd round exit
Let’s be clear about one thing before we keep going: the Oklahoma City Thunder are a juggernaut. The youngest team in the league last season won 57 regular season games and made it two wins away from a trip to the Western Conference Finals, then added multiple veterans who figure to fit like a glove. The rest of the league might not be ready for how good this team is going to be from October through May. MVP runner-up Shai Gilgeous-Alexander is entering what should be the prime of his career, while Jalen Williams continues an ascent to potential All-Star status. Isaiah Joe, Luguentz Dort, Alex Caruso and Isaiah Hartenstein are all incredibly valuable rotation players. This is a team that probably has real championship aspirations, but the player whose performance hinges on is Chet Holmgren.
Holmgren’s rookie year was delayed a season due to a broken foot, but he was well worth the wait. He entered the league as the most impactful rim protector on the best team in the West, leading the NBA in total blocked shots (and second in blocks per game behind fellow rookie Victor Wembanyama). He’s already a plus on offense, too, thanks to his jumpshot and capable ball skills as a driver. He’s the perfect dribble-pass-shoot cog at the big position for the Thunder’s system, and as he grows into himself he’ll only get deadlier. At this point, the only thing that really matters is how quick that development occurs.
One area the Thunder clearly stood to improve last season was their rebounding, where they ranked 27th and 29th on the offensive and defensive end, respectively, per Cleaning the Glass. It didn’t hold them back from being elite on both ends in the regular season, but became a clear area of need in the playoffs. Adding Hartenstein figured to help a ton in that regard, but he’s slated to miss the first chunk of the regular season with a hand fracture. Holmgren will have to hold down the fort in the meantime, a task where he’d be able to show considerable improvement. His slighter frame doesn’t lend to banging down low, but at seven feet tall with an even longer wingspan he has the potential to grab boards most of the league simply can’t reach. Once Hartenstein is back, I have very, very little to be concerned about with Holmgren on defense. Playing power forward when the full roster is healthy will streamline his defensive responsibilities as a weakside helper, and his defensive floor is already so high that it may tangibly become a force multiplier impact-wise.
On the other end of the floor, Holmgren’s growth could define this team as possibly the best in the league. OKC’s system is built around as many players on the floor being able to keep advantages alive with the shot, drive or cut. Holmgren fit cleanly into this ethos as a rookie, and the presence of Hartenstein could open his repertoire up even further. He can be used as the screener in actions as the sole big, or come off of Hartenstein’s screens in double-big configurations. His size lets him shoot right over many non-center matchups, giving him potential as a nightmare assignment when playing the four. These are incredible developments in a vacuum, but for a team as good as the Thunder it could be the exact thing that pushes them over the top.
That’s the scariest part about Holmgren’s development: every step he takes will make his already incredible team that much more dangerous. His development is in many ways directly tied to how high OKC will fly over the next few years. As this core ages together, they’ll be in prime position to contend in a West that’s shown no signs of getting less competitive any time soon. And though they’re not the only team with a young seven-foot unicorn, they’re on a very small list — one that includes Victor Wembanyama. Being able to match up as well as anyone with who looks to be the biggest obstacle in any Western contender’s way is an absolutely huge deal, and being a step ahead of most of the rest of the league in the meantime could bring incredible results right now. I want to see how fast Chet and the Thunder can reach those heights.
PHX: Just how much will their offseason additions move the needle?
Last season: 49-33 (6th in West), 1st round exit
The Mat Ishbia ownership era of Phoenix Suns history has been defined by near constant upheaval in its short time. On the day he purchased the team — the 2023 trade deadline — they acquired Kevin Durant for Mikal Bridges, Cameron Johnson and a haul of first round picks. His first offseason began by sending Chris Paul and a haul of second round picks to Washington for Bradley Beal; it ended shipping Deandre Ayton to Portland for Jusuf Nurkic and Grayson Allen. Head coach Monty Williams was fired for Frank Vogel. Every single member of the Suns’ 2021 Finals run not named Devin Booker was gone within two years. A 49-win season concluding in a first round sweep at the hands of Minnesota then cost Vogel his job. The Suns entered this offseason with three max contracts eating most of their cap space and thus nearly no flexibility to upgrade a flawed roster, plus no head coach to put it all together.
And somehow, it’s very easy to feel better about this year’s team than last. The Suns spent the last two summers scouring the minimum market for value signings, a strategy which resoundingly failed last season. The team was short on quality NBA players, especially in the backcourt; that they won 49 games despite Beal only playing in 53 is a testament to the greatness they have at the very top. This year, the minimum market was much kinder to them. The market squeezed some talent out of bigger money, and Phoenix could capitalize at positions of need. Notably, their point guard room now has legitimate depth in Tyus Jones and Monte Morris, who immediately become a contender for the most efficient assist-to-turnover backcourt in league history. They also signed Mason Plumlee, a capable backup center who can play as a hub like Phoenix used Nurkic last year. A starting lineup of Jones, Beal, Booker, Durant and Nurkic makes a lot more sense structurally on offense, while Morris, Allen, Plumlee, Royce O’Neale and Josh Okogie are all quality depth pieces. (We’ll see what rookies Ryan Dunn and Oso Ighodaro can bring to the table.)
This team is deeper than last year, and made necessary upgrades at important positions of need. Offensively, this team could be incredibly potent, and they have the star power to match up with anyone. But over an 82-game season, believing in this core of stars all remaining healthy for an extended period of time is wishful thinking. Durant’s 75 games played led the trio, which is 20 more than he’s played in any season since tearing his Achilles six years ago. Booker’s liable to miss around 15 games every season, while Beal hasn’t had a year where he played in more than 60 since 2019. Phoenix’s depth is complementary, meaning there isn’t a lot in the tank to replace the production of the three at the top. Missing one or more for a long stretch could make life really difficult on offense.
Phoenix finished last season with the league’s 12th-ranked defense, per Cleaning the Glass, despite lacking a lot of high-end defensive talent. The hire of Mike Budenholzer as the team’s next head coach gives me some confidence in them sustaining competence on that end. His Milwaukee teams were elite defenses in nearly every regular season he coached there, and though the Suns don’t have a rim protector like Brook Lopez, they will have 48 minutes of a consistent style between Nurkic and Plumlee. We’ll see what schemes Bud implements for this team, but Durant is a proven menace as a weakside helper, a role he slots into nicely next to Nurkic. A lot of their success might just depend on the level Booker and Beal reach individually on that end; if Budenholzer can instill a mentality of competing every possession into this team, I think they’ll be alright.
I wouldn’t be surprised if the Suns won more games than they did last season, nor would I be particularly surprised if injuries drop them closer to the bottom of the West. When they’re healthy, they should be one of the better teams in the West. But this team didn’t give up all of its assets and flexibility to be one of the better teams in the West. If the stated goal of a championship is going to become realistic, then nearly every move on the margins is going to have to hit. Phoenix seemingly learned their lesson from last season while capitalizing on the NBA’s free agent market dynamics. Will it be enough to enter conversations with Oklahoma City, Denver and the conference’s other heavyweights? Or will they be stuck in the middle, unable to ride their superstar talent to the top? The Suns have a unique ceiling among teams like them, and I’m curious to see how close to it they can reach — there’s a chance, however slight, that they could crash the championship party.
POR: Who’s getting traded, and where?
Last season: 21-61 (15th in West), missed postseason
It’s Year Two of the Scoot Henderson era for the Portland Trail Blazers. They’ve assembled an intriguing core of top-10 draft picks the last three seasons between Henderson, Shaedon Sharpe and Donovan Clingan, and they seem to remain firmly in development mode this season. In a hyper-competitive West, it’s more than reasonable to project them finishing dead last. The thing with this roster, though, is that it still has several good NBA players, ones that could help the right team possibly reach another level. This is a good problem to have as a rebuilding team, as valuable players demand valuable assets on the trade market, and the Blazers should still be in asset accumulation mode. And for the time they stay on the roster, they can help the development of the young guys by showing them how it’s done. But that’s a short-term arrangement, and Portland is likely to move on from at least a few of them. The only questions I have are who and where?
Portland began this process on draft day, sending Malcolm Brogdon and two first round picks to the Washington Wizards for Deni Avdija. While some might scoff at the price they paid — giving up two first round picks as a rebuilding team?! — but I was honestly surprised the Wizards didn’t get even more. Avdija is 23 and just came off of the best year of his career, playing the NBA’s most important position at a high level on both ends while on one of the league’s biggest bargain contracts. His presence will help the rest of Portland’s youth now and down the road. Besides, one of the picks they traded was the fourteenth overall selection; they may well have decided the value they’d get from Avdija would be higher than from whomever they’d have drafted. Besides, they already had the seventh selection, which they used to bring in the highly coveted Clingan. Here is where I start to scratch my head a bit. The Blazers still have both Deandre Ayton and Robert Williams III, two starting-caliber centers who have proven their worth on good teams (both played instrumental roles on their previous teams making NBA Finals runs). That’s two players with the pedigree and production to deserve playing time out of the gate, but the Blazers should be making Clingan an organizational priority. Even with Williams’ health issues, I can’t see both being on the roster after this season.
Outside of their crowded center room, the Blazers have two more high-level NBA players that project as opening night starters: Jerami Grant and Anfernee Simons. Both players averaged over 20 points per game last season, and while that production wouldn’t exactly be translated were they to move to a better team, both players still clearly bring valuable skills to the table. Grant, like Avdija, is the exact kind of rangy wing player general managers salivate over. And while he’s not the defender Avdija is, his comfort as a scorer is considerably higher. I can envision a front office convincing themselves Grant is the sort of final piece their team needs to contend. Simons’ skills aren’t as universally applicable across the league, but he could absolutely help the right team. A career 38% shooter on volume, Simons is one of the league’s premiere snipers from range. According to nba.com/stats, he ranked eighth leaguewide last season in shots per game from 25-29 feet (a.k.a. deep three pointers); the only player above him to top his 39.5% shooting mark was Stephen Curry. His ability to create efficient looks for himself that far from the rim has an effect on defenses, and he’s coming off the best passing season of his career. Teams short on halfcourt creation would be wise to inquire about the 25-year-old, who may not factor into Portland’s plans next to Henderson and Sharpe.
To be clear: I’m neither projecting nor advocating for a full teardown. There’s a lot of value in having veterans in the room, both in terms of establishing standards of play and helping young players navigate the beginning of their careers. It makes sense to want established center play next to Henderson to allow him to truly learn the nuances of NBA pick-and-rolls, as well as shooting in the backcourt to keep defenses honest. There are just too many players on the roster who either don’t fit the timeline or the vision of this team long-term, and the Blazers can capitalize on their surplus in a way that benefits them. We’ll see how the trade market unfolds throughout the season, but I wouldn’t be surprised in the slightest if a significant part of it ran through Portland.
SAC: Does this core have a defensive leap in it?
Last season: 46-36 (9th in West), lost in Play-In Tournament
Just two seasons removed from the 48-win season that ended a 16-year playoff drought and brought them back to relevance, the Sacramento Kings are already a different team. Adding DeMar DeRozan to the fold diversifies an offensive attack that teams caught up to last season after taking the league by storm. Next to De’Aaron Fox, Domantas Sabonis and Sixth Man of the Year runner-up Malik Monk, DeRozan gives the Kings four high-level offensive creators capable of putting different kinds of pressure on a defense while augmenting each others’ skills. In Fox and DeRozan, they have two of the best closers in the league. All in all, the Kings’ offense should be a handful to deal with, which should give them a puncher’s chance most nights in this Western Conference. But if their goals are to do anything more than compete for a playoff spot in a loaded conference, then their defense is going to be the bellwether of their success.
The Kings have finished the last two seasons 18th and 25th in defensive rating, respectively, which anyone could tell you isn’t good enough to win a championship, but it’s held them back from potentially even more success than they’ve had. When they had the best offense in the league in 2023, it covered up for their deficiencies on that end to the tune of a third seed finish in the West; when that offense stalled to 19th in 2024, they couldn’t make it out of the Play-In Tournament. There’s a pretty hard ceiling on teams that can’t play both sides of the ball at an adequate level, and the Kings will continue to bump up against theirs so long as this is the team’s identity. Fortunately for them, a couple of developments last season could help foster a meaningful improvement on that end.
The case to be excited about the Kings’ potential on defense begins with Keegan Murray and Keon Ellis. They began their careers together under very different circumstances — Murray was the fourth pick in the 2022 draft while Ellis went undrafted — but in their second seasons became the most essential components of Sacramento’s defensive infrastructure. Murray built on a season which saw him set the rookie record for made three-pointers by becoming a stopper capable of guarding the opponent’s best wings, while Ellis hounded point guards at the point of attack and turned into one of the league’s most disruptive defenders. Those defensive roles are crucial for any team; for the Kings, they’re utterly essential. Both players should shot into the starting lineup, where Ellis and Fox could legitimately become one of the better defensive backcourts in the league, so long as Fox is able to sustain a high level of play.
But the way the Kings will find success defending with a non-rim protector in Sabonis is to play on a string, eschewing rim protection for crisp rotations to plug gaps as they appear. DeRozan has settled into a helper role at power forward as he’s aged, which will be put to the test in rotation behind Sabonis when he plays higher on the floor on ball screens. So long as Sacramento can limit opposing shots at the rim and keep the ball in front of them, that sort of scheme can work. Off the bench, Trey Lyles works as a two-way cog, but there’s precious little in terms of proven defensive depth. Perhaps the next step for Monk is becoming a better defender, but that can’t be assumed. It’s possible the Kings were hoping rookie guard Devin Carter could work his way into the rotation as a player with high defensive upside, but he’s slated to miss most of this season after tearing his labrum this summer.
I don’t know if the Kings believe they have a legitimate shot to win a championship this season, but signing a 35-year-old star in free agency is a sure indication they weren’t content with their spot in the West. One of the NBA’s best feel-good stories of the last several seasons has found itself at an inflection point in a conference that’s already passing them by. There’s simply so much competition for a decent seed, or even to escape the Play-In Tournament. If the Kings are to break through, then they’re going to have to take a step forward on that end. A progression to even average or slightly better could be enough to win lots of games if their offense hits its upside. But there isn’t a path forward if that progression never comes. I’m sure the Kings know all this, and so I’m very curious to see how their season unfolds.
SAS: How good is Victor Wembanyama already?
Last season: 22-60 (14th in West), missed postseason
I’m not going to bury the lede here: Victor Wembanyama has arrived. The reigning Rookie of the Year and runner-up for Defensive Player of the Year now has an NBA season and Olympic gold medal game run under his belt, and will return to a San Antonio Spurs roster ready to take a step forward. The degree to which they’ll succeed is unclear at this juncture, if for no other reason than the Western Conference being an utter bloodbath. They probably don’t boast a top ten roster in the West, the theoretical cut off to even enter the postseason at all. But they might boast a top ten player in the West. Or maybe the league. Or maybe ten is way too low for both — my point being, Wemby’s here, folks. The literal only question I have for the Spurs this season is just how here is he yet?
Much has been made of the Spurs’ net rating last season when Wembanyama shared the court with Tre Jones, San Antonio’s only traditional point guard. The season-long number (+5.2) is pretty robust for a team that won only 22 games, and many have cited it as a reason for the Spurs to upgrade their ball-handling and playmaking in the backcourt. Well, they did just that and then some, bringing in Chris Paul for his 20th season. The bona fide Hall of Famer will make Victor’s life exceptionally easy out of the pick-and-roll while providing invaluable mentorship on how to steer a superstar ship. That signing alone is enough reason to be excited about watching Spurs games this year (if you weren’t already), but it also misses the forest for the trees a tiny bit. Because what people have neglected to mention is that the five man unit of Tre Jones, Devin Vassell, Keldon Johnson, Jeremy Sochan and Wembanyama — the team’s second-most used lineup last season — posted a net rating of +25.6. Plus twenty-five point six. That’s more points per 100 possessions better than the opponent than the team won games last season. Remove Wembanyama, and lineups with just the other four had a net rating of -2.5. Wembanyama’s presence next to that foursome turned them from pretty bad to world-breakingly good. As a teenager.
The bar set by Wembanyama last season was incredibly high — being the first rookie to ever be named First Team All-Defense and just the seventh unanimous Rookie of The Year ever will do that. In fact, it’s already so high, and he’s developing so fast, that it’s almost unfair to judge the rest of the youth on the roster against him. That doesn’t mean they aren’t worth discussing, though. Vassell’s health has been a question the last two seasons, but he’s one of the league’s more dynamic shooters; the next steps he takes on both ends could vault him into All-Star conversations down the road. The Point Sochan experiment resoundingly failed last season (although I can’t say I believe it was ever intended to succeed), but he still oozes with potential as an athletic forward with defensive versatility and tenacity, plus real connective passing chops. And we’ll see the role he plays, but fourth overall pick Stephon Castle enters the league with an incredible defensive pedigree from college and the desire to play point guard long-term — who better to learn from than Paul?
All three of those players, plus Johnson (the longest-tenured Spur and Olympic Gold Medalist under Gregg Popovich) figure to be pretty big parts of the Spurs’ core around Wembanyama. Their development over the course of the season is not just critical for San Antonio’s long-term plans, but could significantly impact their finish this season. But what if it just doesn’t? What if Wembanyama is already so good, so game-breaking on both ends, that he can carry his minutes to such a degree that the team just wins a bunch of games? That +25.6 number has been in my head all summer, and it should frankly terrify the rest of the NBA. I’m sure it actively does. The Spurs are on an inevitable path towards title contention, health permitting. This year will give us a pretty good idea of just how quickly they reach their destination. And to the other 29 teams: the future is here. Good freaking luck.
UTA: Can they be bad enough?
Last season: 31-51 (12th in West), missed postseason
When the Utah Jazz traded Rudy Gobert and Donovan Mitchell for a war chest of draft picks in 2022, it marked the beginning of a new era for the franchise. They were widely expected to take a major step back and throw their hat in the lottery ring for a few years, but Lauri Markkanen’s ascendence into one of the league’s most efficient high-volume scorers and Will Hardy proving his mettle immediately as a legitimately good NBA head coach changed things in the short term. I’m sure the Jazz didn’t expect to start each of the last two seasons in the thick of the West Play-In race, as evidenced by their honestly blatant tanking down the stretch of both. And while I’m sure the Jazz are happy to have found themselves with an All-Star level player and long-term answer at head coach, it also cost them a meaningful ticket in the Victor Wembanyama sweepstakes in 2023. Markkanen’s good, but he’s almost universally agreed to be best served as a second option if he’s to be on a great team. With one of the strongest draft classes in recent years coming up, I’d imagine they finally want a bite at the apple for a potential franchise-changer.
The issue, which shouldn’t be particularly surprising given the position they’ve been in for two years now, is that this roster is actually halfway decent. There’s NBA depth across multiple positions, to the point where it’s not super easy to see where some young players will get consistent minutes. Veterans like Jordan Clarkson, Collin Sexton and John Collins project to be rotation mainstays, while the organization seems to be heavily invested in Keyonte George, Taylor Hendricks and Walker Kessler. Rookie Cody Williams should see the floor, as could Kyle Filipowski, but there aren’t guaranteed roles to be filled out by the youngsters like on some other teams. This is almost certainly not even a Play-In team given the strength of the conference, but it’s really easy to envision this team being semi-competitive.
As I alluded to before, semi-competitive shouldn’t be — and probably isn’t — the goal. There are several teams whose primary goal this season is to Capture the Flagg; it’s going to be difficult to finish with a worse record than all of (two of?) Washington, Brooklyn and Portland. Beyond them, there are several Eastern Conference teams that can be described as middling at best. It’s basically impossible for all of Chicago, Detroit, Charlotte, Atlanta and Toronto to hit their high-end outcomes this season, but far more likely for at least one to pivot in the other direction midseason. If Utah can’t position themselves at the bottom of that pecking order, then they could find themselves picking closer to 14 than 1 for the third year in a row pretty easily. We’ll see what kind of trades become available to them, but we can’t guarantee that any will happen — or that one or more of the aforementioned teams don’t tear themselves down even further.
Despite never winning a championship in their franchise history, the Jazz are one of the more storied winning organizations in the NBA. I bet you didn’t know they have the fourth-highest regular season winning percentage in NBA history, trailing only the five-time champion Spurs, eighteen-time champion Celtics, and seventeen-time champion Lakers. (Consider that fun fact your reward for making it this far). There’s a legitimate organizational standard of winning to be upheld. To that effect, these last two seasons of faux playoff contention have been very Jazz. But head of basketball ops Danny Ainge knows as well as anybody that winning at the highest level is what really matters. He’s put Utah in great position for a rebuilding team with all their assets, but there has to be an endgame. That endgame will most likely arrive through the draft, and so I’m sure this is the question Utah is asking themselves right now. Will this be the year they finally take a step back — and in the process, take a huge step forward? This one’s short, I know, but this feels like the only thing that hangs over the Jazz right now.